Abstract-The massive integration of renewable energy sources into the power grid ecosystem with the aim of reducing carbon emissions must cope with their intrinsically intermittent and unpredictable nature. Therefore, the grid must improve its capability of controlling the energy demand by adapting the power consumption curve to match the trend of green energy generation. This could be done by scheduling the activities of deferrable electrical appliances. However, communicating the users' needs about the usage of the electrical appliances leaks sensitive information about habits and lifestyles of the customers, thus arising privacy concerns. This paper proposes a privacypreserving framework to allow the coordination of energy consumption without compromising the privacy of the users: the service requests generated by the domestic appliances are diveded in crypto-shares using Shamir Secret Sharing scheme and collected through an anonymous routing protocol based on Crowds by a set of schedulers, which schedule the requests operating directly on the shares. We discuss the security guarantees provided by our proposed infrastructure and evaluate its performance, comparing it with the optimal scheduling obtained through an Integer Linear Programming formulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most relevant goals in the design of the future energy grid is the massive introduction of power plants exploiting Renewable Energy Sources (RES, e.g. wind, solar and geothermal energy) to reduce carbon emission and shift towards a more sustainable power usage. However, due to the intrinsic unpredictability in the production of "green" power caused by the intermittent nature of renewables, the new Smart Grid scenario will cope with numerous issues related to the balancing of energy generation and consumption within the grid, in order to satisfy the energy demand while avoiding energy wastage. In addition, the energy market will experience more uncertain conditions, which could possibly affect the dynamics of the energy pricing [1] .
In order to increase flexibility in the energy utilization, three complementary approaches have been proposed: the first is to equip the grid with high capacity storage banks, capable of storing energy surpluses and to release them in case of energy production deficits [2] . However, today's state-of-theart technology is still immature to allow a widespread introduction of storage plants, which would require tremendous installation and maintenance costs. A second possibility is to induce some modifications in the user's energy utilization Cristina Rottondi is funded by Fondazione Ugo Bordoni behavior by designing variable tariffs or introducing incentives to shift the use of some appliances to off-peak hours [3] . Unfortunately, this approach does not provide any form of direct control on the load conditions of the grid. Finally, the third alternative relies on load scheduling approaches operating at single household level or at neighborhood/microgrid level with the aim of shaping the energy demand profile in order to meet the production trend. Such mechanisms work according to the following principle: delay-tolerant operations can be scheduled and initiated only when the green energy production conditions are favorable, while in case of power shortage the starting time can be postponed. Moreover, a wide category of appliances (e.g. refrigerators, air conditioning, cooling/heating systems) can tune (up to a certain extent) their power consumption according to the grid state.
The drawback of the load scheduling approach is that it requires the users to communicate to the scheduler their preferences about the time of use and the energy consumption profile of the appliances to be scheduled, which makes the system prone to Non Intrusive Load Monitoring attacks (NILM). In fact, it has been widely proved that, by analyzing the power consumption trend of an individual household, very detailed information about the personal habits of the occupants can be inferred [4] , [5] , making it possible even to identify the specific electrical appliances working in a given time period. Therefore, designing a load scheduling system capable of preserving the privacy of the users is still an open issue.
In this paper, we propose a privacy-friendly infrastructure to perform appliance load scheduling within a neighborhood, directly exposing neither the time of use and the energy consumption pattern of the single appliances, nor the identity of the users specifying the scheduling requests. Our solution relies on a set of schedulers which collaboratively perform the load planning by means of a MultiParty Computation (MPC) protocol based on Shamir Secret Sharing scheme. The proposed architecture is in line with the recent proposals by regulation bodies: for example, the California Public Utilities Commission [6] fosters the realization of Energy Data Centers aimed at the collection and elaboration of energy consumption data and run by governmental or public entities. While such Data Centers are assumed to be honest, our proposed architecture ensures no violation of the customers' privacy even in presence of not fully trusted collectors behaving according to the "honest but curious" model.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section II provides a short overview of the related literature, while Section III recalls some background notions. Section IV describes the privacy-preserving scheduling architecture. The attacker model and the security analysis of our proposed infrastructure are discussed in Section V. In Section VI, the scheduling problem is formulated as an Integer Linear Program, which is used as benchmark for the complexity and performance assessment provided in Section VII. Conclusions are drawn in the final Section.
II. RELATED WORK
Various models for energy load management systems have been recently proposed by the research community: in [7] , an optimal and automatic residential energy consumption scheduling framework is described, which attempts to strike a balance between minimizing the electricity payment and minimizing the waiting time for the operation of each appliance in the household, in presence of time-variable tariffs. The problem is modelled by means of a linear programming formulation and a weighted average price prediction filter is used to estimate the future trend of the energy tariff. A realtime residential load management model and algorithm is also discussed in [8] , which differentiates the scheduling policy according to the type of electrical appliances to be served (interruptible, non interruptible and must-run). However, in both cases the system is designed for a single household, while our scheduling framework is aimed at controlling multiple residential buildings. The authors of [9] propose a neighborhood scheduler which divides the energy requests in queues according to their shape and priority and optimize the service time of deferrable individual appliances (e.g. washing machines, dishwashers, cloth driers, and electric vehicles recharging). In this paper, we deal with the same scenario and appliance category.
Though the problem of securely managing the energy consumption data has been widely studied in the context of the Automatic Metering Infrastructure (AMI) of Smart Grid, to the best of our knowledge this is the first work specifically dealing with data security in a load scheduling framework. Among the techniques proposed to securely collect meter readings, paper [10] describes a wavelet-based data perturbation method to allow multiple entities to access the data generated by a meter with different levels of detail, according to their needs and access rights. Alternative techniques rely on data perturbation [11] , [12] , pseudonymization [13] , [14] , or on data aggregation by means of MultiParty Computation [15] , [16] . Our proposed privacy-preserving scheduling infrastructure is inspired by the one presented in [16] and is based on the same homomorphic encryption scheme, named Shamir Secret Sharing.
III. BACKGROUND

A. Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme
Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme [17] belongs to the family of cryptographic threshold schemes, that are designed to allow the collaborative reconstruction of a secret. In a (w, t)-threshold scheme, the secret is divided in w parts called shares, which are distributed among the protocol participants and can be reconstructed if at least t ≤ w participants cooperate.
The SSS scheme works as follows: let m ∈ Z q be the secret, where q is a prime number, greater than w and than all the possible secrets. To split the secret in w shares, chose t − 1 integer random numbers ρ 1 , ρ 2 , · · · , ρ t−1 with uniform distribution in [0, q − 1] and calculate the s-th share of the secret m, (x s , y s ) for 1 ≤ s ≤ w, where x s are distinct integer numbers and
The secret can be recovered in presence of at least t shares by using the Lagrange interpolation method. The SSS scheme is fully homomorphic, meaning that both addition and multiplication can be performed directly on the encrypted data, leading to the same result that would be obtained by computing the same operation on the plaintext. More in detail, the sum of two secrets can be locally computed by each participant by summing the corresponding shares. Conversely, multiplication cannot be performed by each participant individually and requires a collaborative procedure, e.g. as the one described in [18] . Therefore, any function that can be expressed in terms of additions and multiplications can be computed on the ciphertext. In particular, several collaborative methods to perform the comparison of two secrets have been proposed (see e.g. [19] , [20] ). In the remainder of the paper, we will adopt the procedure described in [20] .
B. Anonymous Routing with Crowds
Crowds is an anonymous routing protocol originally proposed in [21] to hide the true sender of a message by routing it randomly within a large group of users (the crowd). The protocol assumes the presence of a central node called blender, which is responsible of providing each node with the list of active crowd members and of updating it periodically. Upon receipt of a message, each crowd member behaves as follows: with probability p > 0.5, it forwards the message to a randomly chosen node within the crowd (possibly itself), otherwise it sends the node to the final addressee. For a detailed security analysis of the protocol, the reader is referred to [21] .
IV. THE PRIVACY-FRIENDLY LOAD SCHEDULING FRAMEWORK
As depicted in Fig. 1 , our proposed architecture comprises a set of Appliances, A, each one generating its own load scheduling requests, and a set of Schedulers, S, which collaboratively define the starting delay of the service requests received from the Appliances. Note that, as in [9] , we consider only deferrable and uninterruptable appliances, without providing any guarantee on the maximum delay imposed by the scheduling algorithm on their starting times. The architecture includes a Smart Gateway in each household, which is equipped with secure communication capabilities (e.g. the one proposed by the German Federal Office for Information Security in [22] ) and is responsible of gathering the service requests generated by the Appliances inside the building and to convey them to the Schedulers. In the following we will indicate as G the set of Schedulers. We also assume that:
1) The parties agree on a hybrid encryption algorithm E(K e , ·) and a corresponding decryption algorithm
The hybrid scheme uses state-of-the art secure public key cryptography and symmetric cryptography to transmit messages of any size. 2) Each Scheduler s ∈ S (1 ≤ s ≤ w) has its own pair of public/private keys (K s e , K s d ) and all the Gateways know the public keys of the Schedulers.
3) All the communication channels among the nodes of the architecture are confidential and authenticated. 4) a Configurator node acts as a blender for the Crowds routing protocol. The design goal is to anonymously collect the load scheduling requests generated by the Appliances and to convey them to the Schedulers, which securely set through a collaborative procedure the start delay of each Appliance with a firstfit approach, so that the total expected load of the active Appliances does not exceed the expected amount of energy generated by RES. We assume that this supply curve is public and known to all the Schedulers. Then, the scheduled starting times are communicated to the Appliances.
Whenever an Appliance a ∈ A initiates a new service request, it sends to the local Gateway g a sequence V a (i)
The expected daily energy production by RES is expressed by the sequence T (j) (1 ≤ j ≤T , whereT Ṽ ). For the sake of easiness, we suppose that such amount is the net energy obtained after subtracting the expected consumption by non-deferrable appliances and other critical loads, which are not considered by the scheduling algorithm. Each Scheduler locally stores a sequence P s (j) which records the overall power load experienced by the grid, given by the sum of the energy consumption curves of all the appliances already scheduled. Such sequence is initialized as P s (j) = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤T . Let τ be the (discretized) time at which the s-th Scheduler receives a new load service request. The Scheduler operates as follows:
1) It decrypts the message E(K for j = τ + 1, . . . , τ +Ṽ , and P s (j) = P s (j) otherwise. Note that, thanks to the homomorphic properties of SSS with respect to addition, increasing the actual load curve with the contribution of the new appliance can be done by operating directly on the shares.
2) It computes the results of the comparison P s (j) ≤ T (j) for j = τ + 1, . . . , τ +Ṽ collaboratively with the other Schedulers according to the protocol defined in [20] . If the inequality is satisfied for all theṼ samples, the load service requests is scheduled at time Γ a = τ + 1 and the sequence P s (j) is updated with the current value of P s (j). Otherwise, τ is increased by 1 and steps 1-2 are repeated.
If τ exceedsT −Ṽ , the Schedulers cannot find a feasible schedule for the a-th Appliance. In this case, an error message is returned and the local household must decide whether to serve the Appliance with non RES energy or not to run the Appliance at all. Once the service request has been scheduled, the corresponding starting time Γ a must be communicated to the appliance that generated it. Since the identity of the sender of the load request is unknown to the Schedulers, one of them is elected as responsible of broadcasting to all the Gateways the pair Γ a , r a . Each Gateway compares the tags associated to the requests generated by the local Appliances to r a and, in case of matching, it uses Γ a as starting time for the a-th Appliance.
For the sake of easiness, we do not discuss the case of multiple requests arriving in a short time interval: we assume that the Schedulers are able to process multiple requests without ambiguities.
A pictorial view of the data flows within the network nodes is presented in Fig. 2 .
V. ATTACKER MODEL AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Attacker Model
We assume a scenario where both Gateways and Schedulers behave according to the honest-but-curious attacker model: they obey to the protocol rules but try to infer the identities of the owners of active electrical appliances and the type of appliance being used. The first objective can be achieved by associating the service requests to the identifier of the Gateway initiating them e.g. through a linking attack, while the second implies the application of NILM techniques. Conversely, we assume that the time of use of the appliances does not represent by itself a sensitive information, as long as it cannot be linked to the owner nor to the type of the electrical appliance.
Similarly to [16] , we define the architecture as oblivious if a collusion of any number of Gateways cannot obtain information about the power consumption pattern and the time of use of the electrical appliances to be scheduled, except for the ones belonging to the local household. Moreover, we say that the architecture is t-blind if a collusion of less than t Schedulers cannot learn anything about the energy consumption trend of the appliances to be scheduled. Finally, according to the definition in [23] , the architecture provides c-sender anonymity if a collusion of at most c Gateways and any number of Schedulers cannot associate a request to the identity of the user whose appliance generated it.
B. Security Analysis
We now discuss how the security properties defined in Section V-A are satisfied by our proposed infrastructure.
Obliviousness: For what concerns the request collection phase, as long as the public key cryptosystem used by the Schedulers is semantically secure (i.e., any probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm (PPTA) taking as input the encryption and the length of a message cannot determine any partial information on the message with probability nonnegligibly higher than all other PPTA's that take as input only the message length [24] ), even if a collusion of Gateways collects all the w encrypted shares of a given service request, it cannot access the encrypted data. Therefore, the proposed architecture is oblivious.
Blindness: paper [17] proves that in the SSS scheme no information can be obtained by collecting a set of less than t shares, therefore a collusion of less than t Schedulers cannot access the load profile of the appliance which generated a service request. Since in this paper we assume t = w, information leakages can occur only in case all the w Schedulers are compromised and the infrastructure is w-blind.
Sender Anonymity: paper [21] proves that, from the point of view of the entity to which the messages are sent, the Crowds protocol provides sender anonymity beyond suspicion, meaning that the node sending the message is no more likely to be the initiator of the message with respect to any other node of the network. Moreover, [21] proves that Crowds ensures probable innocence (meaning that the sender appears no more likely to be the originator than to not be the originator) in presence of up to c colluded Gateways, provided that |G| > p p−0.5 (c + 1) Therefore, if such condition is met, the identity of the owner of the appliance generating the request remains undisclosed to a collusion of at most c Gateways and any number of Schedulers, thus the architecture provides csender anonymity.
Moreover, though in Section V-A we assumed that the knowledge of the scheduled starting times of the electrical appliances does not lead to any leakage of sensitive information, it is worth noting that our proposed infrastructure can be straightforwardly enhanced to include a symmetric encryption scheme for the secure communication of the timestamps Γ a .
VI. INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAMMING FORMULATION
In order to evaluate the performance of our privacypreserving scheduling approach, we propose as benchmark the following Integer Linear Programming (ILP) model. It assumes to receive as input the time of arrival of each service request and the corresponding appliance load profile, within the time span considered for the allocation of the energy requests. Conversely, our scheduling infrastructure performs the allocation in real-time without having access to the individual energy consumption profile of the electrical appliances.
Sets:
• A: set of Appliances • I: set of discretized time instants within the optimization time span
Parameters:
• e i : amount of supplied energy at time i ∈ I • t a : time of arrival of the service request generated by Appliance a ∈ A • k ai : binary variable, it is 1 if i ≥ t a , 0 otherwise • c aij : load profile of appliance a ∈ A at time i ∈ I, assuming a scheduled starting time j ∈ I Variables:
• y ai : binary variable, it is 1 if the scheduled starting time of appliance a ∈ A is i ∈ I, 0 otherwise
Objective function:
Constraints:
a∈A,j∈I c aij y aj ≤ e i ∀i ∈ I (2)
The objective function (1) minimizes the sum of the delays experienced by the Appliances. Constraint (2) imposes that the total consumed energy never exceed the amount of energy provided by the supplier. Constraint (3) ensures that the Appliance starting times are scheduled after the arrivals of the service requests, while Constraint (4) imposes that exactly one starting time is assigned to each Appliance.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this Section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed scheduling mechanism in terms of computational complexity, message number and length. Moreover, we compare the achieved average load service delay to the optimal results obtained by means of the ILP formulation presented in Section VI. In our implementation, we assumed a 256 bit-long modulo q for the SSS scheme. The appliance tag r a is assumed to have length of 32 bits, while the timestamp Γ a is a 32 bit-long POSIX time. The hybrid cryptosystem used for the share encryption is RSA-OAEP with a suitable symmetric encryption scheme and modulo n of 1024 bits.
A. Computational Complexity
We start discussing the asymptotic complexity by evaluating the number of incoming/outgoing messages for each node and scheduling phase. As showed in Table I , the number of messages exchanged by the Gateways exhibits a linear dependence on and w, while for the Schedulers it depends linearly onṼ and Γ a and superlinearly on w (the logarithmic factor is due to the collaborative comparison procedure discussed in [20] ). However, since the total number of shares w is expected to be limited and the time delay Γ a cannot be controlled by the system designer, the sample numberṼ is the only tunable parameter significantly influencing the system complexity. Table II reports the type and number of operations performed by each node for the scheduling of a single service request. The computational cost of each operation is detailed in Table III based on [20] , [18] . The most demanding operation is the share collaborative comparison performed by the Schedulers in multiple rounds depending on w.
Finally, it is worth discussing the message length: each service request generated/forwarded by the Gateways and received by a Scheduler is an RSA-encrypted message of 1024 bits. During the share comparison procedure, each of theṼ shares is in turn divided in w shares and redistributed among the Schedulers. Assuming to performṼ comparisons per round, each Scheduler sends/receives w − 1 messages per round ofṼ · 256 bits each (see [20] for further details). Ultimately, the starting time Γ a and tag r a are broadcasted Table III for the cost details by the head Scheduler to all Gateways, thus requiring |G| messages of 32+32=64 bits each.
B. Numerical Assessment
To compare the service delay introduced by our first-fit scheduling approach to the minimum delay obtainable through an optimization procedure, we extracted several load profiles of dishwashers (peak consumption of 1500 W) and washing machines (peak consumption of 750 W) from the SMART* dataset [25] and sampled them with a rate of one sample every 5 minutes. As renewable energy supplying profile, we considered a windfarm with peak production of 50 kW: the normalized hourly production (available at [26] ) has been linearly interpolated to obtain a 5 minutes sampling period. We considered a scenario with 100 appliances, each generating a service request with uniform distribution within a period of 24 hours, and 365 instances, corresponding to 1 year of wind energy production data. For each instance, both the scheduling approach proposed in Section IV and the ILP formulation described in Section VI have been applied. Table  IV reports the respective probabilities of finding a feasible solution to the scheduling problem. For approximately 29% of the considered instances, both approaches do not provide a feasible result: this happens when the overall daily energy production is not sufficient to satisfy all the service requests. In a borderline scenario, where the amount of wind energy is only slightly greater than the total energy demand, it may happen that our proposed scheduling approach fails in providing a feasible schedule, while the ILP formulation succeeds. However, we incurred in such condition only for the 1.5% of the considered instances. Finally, in most cases (around 70%), both approaches provide feasible solutions to the scheduling problem: the average delay between service request and starting time experienced by a single appliance is in the order of 30 minutes, with an average increase of 25% with respect to the optimal solutions obtained through the ILP model and the suboptimal scheduling of our proposed infrastructure. Therefore, our scheduling mechanisms protects 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a privacy-preserving framework for the scheduling of power consumption requests generated by electrical Appliances in a Smart Grid scenario. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to address the problem of securely handling user data to provide a load scheduling service. The energy consumption requests generated by the smart Appliances located in the users' households within a neighborhood are anonymously conveyed to a set of Schedulers by means of a Crowds-based routing protocol. The Schedulers collaboratively define the schedule of the requests using a Multiparty Computation mechanism based on Shamir Secret Sharing scheme. We evaluate the security guarantees provided by our proposed infrastructure assuming an honestbut-curious attacker model and show through numerical results that it provides only modest gaps with respect to the optimal solutions obtained by means of an Integer Linear Programming formulation.
